Poston strike

The Poston, Arizona, concentration camp was located in the Arizona desert near the California border and was the largest and most populous of all the WRA camps in the fall of 1942. Unique among all of the WRA camps, Poston was co-managed by the Office of Indian Affairs. (OIA). Nearly all of the inmates there came from California and most came from rural parts of southern, central, and central coastal areas. Poston was also unique in that it consisted of three separate camps located three miles apart from each other, with Unit I, the northernmost, being about twice as large as either Units II or III. Unit I had a more heterogeneous population than the other units, mixing rural Southern Californians from Orange, Riverside, San Diego, and Imperial Counties, some Central Californians from Bakersfield and Delano, a small number of Arizonans, and a group of city people from the Boyle Heights section of Los Angeles, just east of downtown. ^[1]

Beyond the general trauma all Japanese Americans who had been forcibly removed from their West Coast homes faced, the Poston inmates had several other sources of discontent. Though conditions were bad everywhere, Poston's extreme heat—temperatures remained well over 100º throughout the summer—combined with minimal shade and dust storms made conditions there among the worst. The uneasy partnership of the WRA and OIA in managing the camp was another source of stress for inmates as the two agencies had different goals with the former emphasizing the temporary nature of the camp, while the latter focused on building a long term community. Many inmates resented doing arduous agricultural work and building camp infrastructure they felt would ultimately benefit Native Americans for the menial WRA wages. To add insult to injury, white employees received salaries that were orders of magnitudes higher and had better housing and food. Paychecks were also delayed for months and riddled with errors. Tensions had risen with a series of arrests of Poston inmates by the FBI, the arrival of inmates who had been "paroled" from Justice Department administered internment camps to rejoin their families at Poston, and a spate of beatings of suspected "inu" in September and October. ^[2]

Some of the key figures in the Poston Strike included:

• Kay Nishimura: a thirty-one-year-old Kibei from the Imperial Valley who was a former rice broker. He had been active in the Anti-Axis League, an organization formed by Nisei super patriots after the attack on Pearl Harbor that was widely believed to have reported names of Issei to the FBI and that branded Nishimura as a suspected "inu." He had also been married to the sister of George Fujii, a union that had ended with an acrimonious divorce. In Poston, Nishimura had also worked with much disliked Reports Officer Norris James as a translator. ^[3]

• George Fujii: a twenty-seven-year-old Kibei from Orange County whose relatively wealthy family ran a large restaurant. Though he graduated high school in Japan, he spoke English well and had gone to USC for two years. ^[4]

• Isamu Uchida: also twenty-seven and also Kibei, Uchida was son of an Orange County farmer who spoke little English. A judo expert, he taught judo at Poston. ^[5]

• John Evans: a forty-year-old New Yorker, he was the son of Mabel Dodge Luhan, a wealthy heiress and arts patron. Evans had had a varied career as a rancher, miner, store proprietor, and journalist, and had published two novels. Evans was the administrator of Unit I. ^[6]

• Wade Head: Born in Arkansas and raised in Oklahoma as the son of a doctor, the thirty-six-year-old Head had been superintendent of the Papago Indian Reservation in southern Arizona just prior to his appointment at Poston. He had also been principal of an agricultural school in the Philippines prior to that, where he had come to know Nikkei farmers and fishermen. Head was Poston's project director. ^[7]

On Saturday night, November 14, 1942, a group of attackers roused Kay Nishimura from his bed in a bachelors' barracks and beat him with a pipe, rendering him unconscious. Inmate police quickly rounded up fifty suspects and Internal Security Chief Ernest Miller and Reports Officer James interviewed them before deciding to detain Fujii and Uchida, who were arrested at 1:30 pm on Sunday. Family members of the accused and others in their Block (both lived in Block 28) feared they would be taken out of camp to be tried, which they felt was sure to be unfair. By Tuesday, a petition calling for their release began to circulate among Orange County denizens, and a small group of Issei went to visit Head to present the petition and ask for the men's release. Head told them that he could not do that until the FBI had investigated. On Wednesday morning, the 18th, Head and his top aide left the camp to go to a meeting, leaving Evans in charge. ^[8]

Things heated up on the 18th. A crowd began to gather around the police station where the men were being held in the morning and inmate leaders made speeches to the growing crowd. Evans addressed the crowd at around 1 pm, promising justice and asking them to disburse to no avail. In the meantime, the official inmate government—an elected Temporary Community Council (TCC) that included one Nisei representative from each block and an associated Issei Advisory Board (IAB)—met with Evans to request that he let them handle the case, which he refused to do. They all resigned on the spot. The TCC/IAB reconvened to select a new group to meet with Evans and agreed on an Emergency Council that would include one Issei and one Nisei per block, a total of 72 (EC72). This group then selected a smaller Emergency Executive Council (EEC) to be the negotiating group. At the same time, Evans met with his staff to consider whether to bring in the army; though there was substantial support for doing so, Evans decided not to for the time being. The EC72 begin to make plans for a mass strike. Late that night, the EEC sent Evans a note proposing that if essential services are kept running, there would be no violence, which Evans agreed to. ^[9]

All of Unit I was on strike by Thursday, the 19th, with only essential services—mess halls, hospital, fire department, etc.—remaining staffed. Each block organized to send picketers to the police station site to serve eight hour shifts. The FBI informed Evans that they were suspending the investigation and that the suspects no longer needed to be held. Evans and his staff decided to release Fujii but to retain Uchida, whom they felt there was evidence against. The EC72 met with Evans at 1:30, at which time he informed them that Fujii will be released, but that Uchida will be tried for assault by the state, though he will remain in the camp until at least Monday. The EC72 relayed this information to the crowd at about 8 pm, imploring them to continue the strike. Over the course of the day, more substantial block signs began to appear that were designed to look like the Japanese flag and Japanese martial music played. Representatives from Unit I went to leaders of Units II and III to see if they would join the strike; the other camps were split on the issue and ultimately decided not to. On the 20th, the OIA, WRA, and local officials gave Evans permission to try Uchida in the camp; Evans asked an intermediary from Unit II to feel out the strikers about a plan to end the strike if Uchida were to be released to be tried at Poston. Though the strike leaders leaned towards accepting this, they decided to take it to the blocks for a vote, which came back almost evenly divided. The strike dragged on, with strike fatigue beginning to show up. The EC72 met early Saturday morning and decided to wait for Head's return before proceeding. ^[10]

Head returned on Sunday, the 22nd. He gathered facts and considered bringing in the army, ultimately deciding against it. On Monday morning, Head met with the EEC, offering the release of Uchida on the condition of concessions that would lead to a more peaceful community. Later that day, they agreed on provisions that included (a) the establishment of a Public Relation Committee that would investigate those accused of being "inu"; (b) that inmates be given the right to select inmate administrative personnel; and (c) the formation of a City Planning Board along the lines of the EC72. After some final negotiations, the strike came to a peaceful end on Tuesday, the 24th. Head spoke to the crowd and received a great ovation. The crowd disbursed by 11 pm. By the next morning, Issei had cleaned up the strike area. ^[11]

In the aftermath of the strike, the EC72 essentially became the new City Planning Board after camp-wide elections. Though they did form an "Honor Court" that would be the "inu" tribunal, it never really functioned, given administrative unease about it and the fact that "inu" beatings largely stopped after the strike, especially as many of those who would be targeted " resettled " as soon as they could. Uchida had a warrant for his arrest issued in December and spent two days in the Yuma County Jail when the U.S. attorney dropped the charges. No trial ever took place in Poston. He eventually went to Tule Lake . Fujii married in Poston a few months later, and the couple had a baby son in 1944. When the draft was reinstated for Nisei in early 1944, Fujii protested and was tried—and acquitted—of sedition for advocating draft resistance. He and his family stayed until the camp's closing, eventually returning to Orange County. Nishimura also married in Poston and left for Salt Lake City with his wife in July of 1943. Evans left Poston in April 1943 for another government position. Head left Poston in January 1944 with the withdrawal of the OIA, resuming his former position with the OIA. ^[12]

The various chroniclers of the Poston Strike reached a number of conclusions. Anthropologist and Poston fieldworker Tamie Tsuchiyama reported that after the strike, there was a "growing sentiment [among inmates] prevailing in camp that we got cheated out in the negotiations." She also noted that Nisei became more politically conscious. Bureau of Sociological Research head Alexander Leighton wrote that "the strike was a revolt of the Isseis and an assertion of their demand to have more say in the management of their affairs and to rule, rather than be ruled by, their children." The official WRA history claims that "[o]n the whole the incident probably provided a healthy release for pent-up emotions and qualified observers are generally agreed that Poston emerged as a stronger and more stable community after it was over." In a 1970s critique of this view, historian Gary Okihiro reinterprets the strike through a colonial framework that posits "a preexistent, underlying layer of resistance potential." There has been little recent scholarship on the strike. ^[13]

Hayashi, Brian Masaru. Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Hirabayashi, Lane Ryo. The Politics of Fieldwork: Research in an American Concentration Camp . Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999.

Leighton, Alexander H. The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp . New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1945.

Okihiro, Gary Y. “Japanese Resistance in America's Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation.” Amerasia Journal 2.1 (1973): 20-34.

Tsuchiyama, Tamie. " Chronological Account of the Poston Strike, Nov. 1942. " The Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement: A Digital Archive, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, BANC MSS 67/14 c, folder J6.24.